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ABSTRACT 
Objectives. We sought to describe the integration of syndromic surveillance 
data into daily surveillance practice at local health departments (LHDs) and 
make recommendations for the effective integration of syndromic and report-
able disease data for public health use.
Methods. Structured interviews were conducted with local health directors 
and communicable disease nursing staff from a stratified random sample of 
LHDs from May through September 2009. Interviews captured information on 
direct access to the North Carolina syndromic surveillance system and on the 
use of syndromic surveillance information for outbreak management, program 
management, and the creation of reports. We analyzed syndromic surveil-
lance system data to assess the number of signals resulting in a public health 
response.
Results. Syndromic surveillance data were used for outbreak investigation (19% 
of respondents) and program management and report writing (43% of respon-
dents); a minority reported use of both syndromic and reportable disease data 
for these purposes (15% and 23%, respectively). Receiving data from frequent 
system users was associated with using data for these purposes (p50.016 and 
p50.033, respectively, for syndromic and reportable disease data). A small 
proportion of signals (25%) resulted in a public health response.
Conclusions. Use of syndromic surveillance data by North Carolina local public 
health authorities resulted in meaningful public health action, including both 
case investigation and program management. While useful, the syndromic 
surveillance data system was oriented toward sensitivity rather than efficiency. 
Successful incorporation of new surveillance data is likely to require systems 
that are oriented toward efficiency. 
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Effective use of surveillance data is essential to good 
public health practice. In recent years, public health 
agencies have experienced a significant increase in the 
amount of data available for surveillance (e.g., data 
used for syndromic surveillance), and this increase is 
likely to continue. For example, the federal Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (HITECH Act) supports forwarding medi-
cal record data to public health agencies. Published 
work demonstrates that better data are needed for 
communicable disease surveillance; communicable 
disease reporting is not complete,1 and many cases 
are reported later than is necessary for public health 
action.2 While the medical record data that may be 
provided to public health have the potential to improve 
completeness and timeliness, these datasets are likely 
to have many records that are not usable for public 
health purposes.3 Furthermore, limited staff are avail-
able to review these data.4,5 Effective use of these new 
data for public health surveillance will require efficient 
identification of and access to the usable data elements 
present in new datasets. 
The implementation of syndromic surveillance is 
an example of the incorporation of new data sources. 
Syndromic surveillance systems were established to 
facilitate early detection of events requiring a rapid 
response, such as outbreaks caused by bioterrorism 
agents. Events that may require public health inter-
vention are identified using aberration detection 
algorithms and individual record review. Most states 
have a system of this type,6 and their value for public 
health event detection and characterization has been 
demonstrated.6–10 Lessons learned from attempts to 
integrate syndromic data for public health surveil-
lance and response can inform future management 
of new data. 
While syndromic surveillance data can be valuable 
to public health practice, the design of these systems 
frequently limits their use to jurisdictions with greater 
capacity. Alerts created by system algorithms are often 
of low positive predictive value,11,12 and these systems 
can require a high level of staff time for detecting 
events that require public health action.8 Therefore, 
syndromic surveillance data are most commonly used 
by state and large city public health departments that 
have enough staff time for reviewing alerts and indi-
vidual case records.6,13,14 Although these data can be 
useful to health departments of all sizes, little is known 
about how best to make these data usable in situations 
with limited surveillance staff. The use of syndromic 
surveillance data in smaller population settings, such 
as most local health departments (LHDs), has not 
been described.
North Carolina can provide an example of the 
integration of syndromic surveillance data into pub-
lic health surveillance practice. Current electronic 
surveillance for communicable disease in the state 
includes a population-based syndromic surveillance 
system, the North Carolina Disease Event Tracking and 
Epidemiologic Collection Tool (NC DETECT), and a 
population-based reportable communicable disease 
surveillance system, the North Carolina Electronic Dis-
ease Surveillance System (NC EDSS). Both syndromic 
and reportable disease data have been used for public 
health surveillance since 2006. NC DETECT use is the 
responsibility of syndromic surveillance staff, which 
includes two state-level epidemiologists and 11 hospital-
based epidemiologists. All other public health agency 
staff may use NC DETECT. NC EDSS use is required 
for and restricted to staff responsible for communicable 
disease reporting at state and local levels. 
The objectives of this study were to quantitatively 
assess the use of syndromic surveillance data at state 
and local public health agencies in North Carolina, 
to describe how syndromic surveillance is incorpo-
rated into public health practice in the state, and to 
make recommendations for the effective integration 
of syndromic and reportable disease data for public 
health use. 
MetHoDS
Outcome measures for surveillance data use were 
derived from a logic model of public health surveillance 
(Figure 1). Measures of syndromic surveillance data use 
included (1) the proportion of syndromic surveillance 
signals used for public health action (defined as steps 
taken by public health staff to investigate or report on 
population health events); and (2) the proportion of 
surveillance data users using syndromic surveillance 
information for outbreak investigation, policy develop-
ment and program management, and the creation of 
reports for stakeholders. The measure of combined 
syndromic and reportable disease data use was the 
proportion of users reporting use of both syndromic 
and reportable disease information for these purposes. 
Published guidelines on surveillance system evaluation 
were consulted for this assessment.15–17 
System data analysis
We examined NC DETECT system data from January to 
December 2009 to assess the proportion of syndromic 
surveillance data resulting in public health action. The 
NC DETECT system captures data from emergency 
departments (EDs; visit records), the Carolinas Poison 
Center (CPC; poison control center call records), 
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and the North Carolina Prehospital Medical Informa-
tion System (PreMIS; emergency medical service run 
reports). PreMIS data were not used for public health 
surveillance during the period of this study. 
NC DETECT uses algorithm processing to identify 
dates when the number of cases of a given “syndrome” 
(a combination of symptoms, such as fever with rash) 
is higher than comparison data for previous time 
 periods.18,19 These dates, with the number of syndrome 
cases and links to the case records, are listed in a data-
base as signals that are reviewable by public health staff. 
A system variable can be used to record action taken 
by system users. By default, the variable indicates “not 
yet documented.” After reviewing a signal, syndromic 
surveillance staff members use this variable to indicate 
the level of action taken (e.g., active investigation, 
monitoring, investigation completed, or no action 
needed). In the rare instances of LHD staff review-
ing signals, this variable is generally not used. This 
action-level variable allows staff to assess the number 
of signals meriting public health action by syndromic 
surveillance staff. 
We quantified the proportion of signals at each 
action level, as well as the proportion of signals not 
reviewed (i.e., signals where the action-level variable 
still indicated “not yet documented”). We classified 
signals labeled “active investigation,” “monitoring,” and 
“investigation completed” as signals meriting public 
health action. The types of public health action per-
formed were captured in free-text comments appended 
to the signal record by syndromic surveillance staff. 
Survey
A survey was conducted from May through September 
2009 to gather information on how the NC DETECT 
system and syndromic surveillance data are used at 
state and local levels. Information was collected on 
whether respondents used NC DETECT (direct access) 
and whether respondents received NC DETECT case 
records and/or reports from others (indirect access). 
In addition, information was gathered about two out-
break investigations: a respondent-selected outbreak 
investigation from the past year (June 2008 to May 
2009) and the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak (May to 
August 2009). The survey included questions on how 
respondents were alerted to events of public health 
significance, how such events were monitored, and 
whether NC DETECT and NC EDSS information was 
used for the outbreak investigations, program man-
agement and policy development, and report writing. 
The survey population included public health 
agency staff responsible for surveillance, event 
response, and program management and policy 
development. All epidemiologists in the state division 
of public health communicable disease branch, as 
well as epidemiologists from other groups with the 
potential to use data captured by NC DETECT (e.g., 
an asthma epidemiologist), were invited to participate. 
The 85 LHDs were stratified by population, and one 
very large LHD (population 200,000), seven large 
LHDs (population 53,377–200,000), and seven small 
LHDs (population 53,377) were randomly selected. 
The LHD director and a communicable disease nurse 
Figure 1. Logic model describing public health surveillance data use in North Carolina 
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(CD nurse) from each LHD were invited to participate. 
In all, 48 individuals (18 from state-level health depart-
ments and 30 from LHDs) were invited to participate. 
This sample did not include the hospital-based public 
health epidemiologists who do not have responsibility 
for program management and policy development. 
Two project staff administered the survey via face-to-
face interviews and by telephone when face-to-face 
interviews were not possible. 
To examine user characteristics and uses of syn-
dromic surveillance data, proportions were calculated 
and compared; because of small cell sizes, we used 
Fisher’s exact test and odds ratios (ORs) to assess asso-
ciations. All quantitative data analysis was performed 
using SAS® version 9.1.20 Because responses to questions 
on program management, policy development, and 
report writing were similar, we grouped these results 
for analysis and identified them as program manage-
ment and report writing. We limited our analysis of 
the combined use of syndromic and reportable surveil-
lance data to state epidemiologists and local CD nurse 
staff, who routinely have access to both types of data. 
(State-level chronic disease, environmental, and injury 
epidemiologists did not have access to NC EDSS at the 
time of the survey. In general, LHD directors did not 
use NC EDSS or NC DETECT.) 
ReSuLtS
System data analysis
Between January and December 2009, 961 signals were 
generated from CPC data and 14,858 signals were gen-
erated from ED data. Of the signals from CPC data, 
788 (82%) were reviewed, and 199 (21%) resulted in 
action by public health staff (Figure 2). Of the signals 
from ED data, 3,715 (25%) were reviewed, and 600 
(4%) resulted in action by public health staff. Public 
health action resulting from signal review included 
calls to LHDs, other health agencies, and hospitals; 
participation in investigations; and calls to organiza-
tions potentially involved in an outbreak. The majority 
of ED signals (n511,143; 75%) and a minority of CPC 
signals (n5173, 18%) were not reviewed. 
Survey
Forty-four of 48 invitees participated in the survey 
interview (response rate 5 92%). The final survey 
population included 17 state-level staff (epidemiologists 
and public health nurses responsible for communicable 
disease, tuberculosis, immunization, environmental 
epidemiology, chronic disease, injury, surveillance, and 
preparedness) and 27 staff from 14 LHDs (14 directors 
and 13 CD nurses). 
Syndromic surveillance data were used for outbreak 
investigation, program management, and report writ-
ing by both state- and local-level public health staff. 
Among 13 state-level staff participating in an investiga-
tion in the past year, 31% (four of 13) reported using 
NC DETECT data for outbreak investigation (Figure 3). 
Among LHD staff, 15% (four of 27) reported using 
these data for outbreak investigation. The proportion 
of respondents that reported using NC DETECT data 
for management of the H1N1 influenza outbreak was 
higher: 59% (10 of 17) among state staff and 41% 
(11 of 27) among local staff. Among 15 state-level 
staff participating in program management, eight 
(53%) reported using NC DETECT data for program 
management and report writing. Among 22 LHD staff 
participating in program management, 36% (eight 
of 22) reported using NC DETECT data for program 
management and report writing (Figure 3). 
Survey respondents reported on their access to 
NC DETECT in the 12 months preceding the survey. 
Among the 43 respondents, modes of access included: 
none (n511), direct only (i.e., respondent used NC 
DETECT; n55), indirect only (i.e., respondent received 
information from a user of NC DETECT; n515), or 
both direct and indirect (n512). Respondents report-
ing indirect access received case records and/or reports 
from syndromic surveillance staff (including public 
health epidemiologists), other state staff, and/or hospi-
tal staff. Having indirect access to NC DETECT during 
the 12 months prior to the survey was  associated with 
Figure 2. Proportion of NC DETECT signals  
reviewed and acted upon by public health staff, 
January–December 2009 
NC DETECT 5 North Carolina Disease Event Tracking and 
Epidemiologic Collection Tool
CPC 5 Carolinas Poison Control
ED 5 emergency department
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use of NC DETECT data during an outbreak (Figure 
4; p50.016, OR not calculable); respondents without 
indirect access (whether or not they had direct access) 
did not report using NC DETECT data for outbreak 
investigation. Having indirect access to NC DETECT 
was also associated with the use of syndromic surveil-
lance data for program management and report writing 
(OR57.15, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.3, 39.8). 
Respondents with both direct and indirect access 
most frequently reported use of NC DETECT data 
and information for outbreak investigation, program 
management, and report writing.
Most state and local communicable disease staff 
members can create user accounts for both NC 
DETECT and NC EDSS. Among 13 state-level staff 
who could use both systems, five (38%) reported hav-
ing user accounts and using both, while three (23%) 
LHD CD nurses reported using both (Figure 5). A 
minority of respondents used data (accessed directly 
or indirectly) from both systems: four of 26 (15%) 
staff reported using data from both systems for the 
respondent-selected outbreak investigation and six of 
26 (23%) reported using data from both systems for 
program management and report writing. However, a 
higher proportion (14/26; 54%) reported using data 
from both systems during the H1N1 influenza outbreak 
(data not shown). 
DISCuSSIoN
The routine use of syndromic surveillance data by 
North Carolina state and local public health authorities 
resulted in meaningful public health action, including 
both case investigation and program management. 
Employees at state health departments and LHDs used 
syndromic surveillance data both for the originally envi-
sioned purpose of syndromic surveillance (early event 
detection) and for traditional public health practice. 
Therefore, this new data source has been incorporated 
into daily surveillance practice in North Carolina and 
is used for key public health purposes across the state. 
Although syndromic surveillance data are used for 
public health action, the observed association between 
indirect access and data use suggests that a dedicated 
staff is required to filter the data to identify events 
requiring action. This association is addressed at the 
state level in North Carolina by assigning responsibility 
for filtering to syndromic surveillance staff. However, 
because this small staff cannot review all ED data 
signals, only a subset of signals is reviewed. Because 
limited staff are available for public health surveil-
lance and epidemiology,4,5 it is unrealistic to expect 
this filtering to be performed at the local level. During 
the H1N1 outbreak, a small number of additional per-
sonnel were recruited to send weekly H1N1 influenza 
Figure 3. Proportion of survey respondents using NC DETECT data for public health surveillance activities:  
North Carolina, June 2008 to June 2009 
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reports including syndromic surveillance information 
to all LHDs, and reported use of syndromic surveil-
lance information increased. This finding supports 
the conclusion that the use of syndromic surveillance 
information is limited by the number of staff available 
to distribute it.
Although syndromic surveillance information has 
been integrated into public health practice at the state 
level and in some LHDs, the majority of public health 
staff in North Carolina does not routinely integrate 
NC DETECT and NC EDSS data for outbreak investi-
gation, program management, or report writing. The 
syndromic surveillance staff does not have permission 
to access NC EDSS, so they cannot use NC EDSS data 
Figure 4. Use of NC DETECT data for respondent-selected outbreak investigation, program management,  
and report writing, by access mode: North Carolina, 2009 
aRespondent used NC DETECT
bRespondent received NC DETECT data or information from a user of NC DETECT




Figure 5. Direct access to syndromic and reportable disease surveillance systems among staff members  
with potential access to both systems (n=26): North Carolina, 2009 
NC EDSS 5 North Carolina Electronic Disease Surveillance System
NC DETECT 5 North Carolina Disease Event Tracking and Epidemiologic Collection Tool
LHD 5 local health department
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for context when NC DETECT data are forwarded; 
and local staff responsible for reportable diseases do 
not access NC DETECT because it is not structured for 
their effective use. To have the most complete informa-
tion on the epidemiology of diseases in North Carolina 
and the outbreaks affecting the population, public 
health staff would use data from both NC DETECT 
and NC EDSS. 
Limitations
Although this study provides novel information on 
the use of traditional and new communicable disease 
surveillance systems, it was subject to several important 
limitations. While syndromic surveillance personnel 
conduct most signal review, a small number of others 
review signals but do not use the action-level variable. 
Therefore, the number of signals with an action-level 
change captured by the NC DETECT system represents 
a minimum estimate of the proportion investigated. 
Information captured on the use of syndromic and 
reportable disease data for program and report writing 
purposes was captured only as yes/no. This question 
could not differentiate between relatively simplistic 
use of syndromic surveillance data (e.g., inclusion of 
syndromic surveillance data in one or several reports) 
and real incorporation of this information into pro-
gram development and report writing (e.g., ongoing 
observation of the number of syndrome cases in the 
jurisdiction EDs and inclusion of these numbers in 
reports and program planning discussions). Interviews 
were performed face to face; as such, respondents may 
have reported using surveillance data systems more 
frequently than they normally do, resulting in social 
desirability bias and an overestimation of NC DETECT 
and NC EDSS use. 
Recommendations
We suggest three strategies to support broader use of 
syndromic surveillance and other new data. The first 
is to develop algorithms for syndromic surveillance 
based on actionability. Our findings and others8,11,21 
show that the proportion of signals requiring public 
health action is very small. New algorithms could be 
developed based on the signals that have resulted 
in public health action historically, with the goal of 
identifying similar signals. Because these signals are a 
small proportion of current signals, the total number 
of signals generated by the modified algorithms should 
be smaller. A higher proportion of signals created by 
these new algorithms should merit action by public 
health staff. The importance of including action-
ability in creating syndromes is highlighted in work 
on syndromic surveillance systems across the United 
States.13,18,19 Decreasing the number of non-actionable 
signals to investigate could decrease the time needed 
to review syndromic surveillance data.
Second, the group of users directly accessing syn-
dromic surveillance data and reports could be broad-
ened. This broadening could be supported by Web 
portals designed for users at different levels. Regional 
and/or local-level portals could be designed, including 
maps and reports oriented toward local/regional public 
health action. These reports could include aggregated 
infectious and/or chronic disease data that are useful 
for disease reporting, local program management, and 
report writing; current syndrome signals could also be 
added if desired. These approaches could also be com-
bined, thereby strengthening syndromic surveillance 
data algorithms while making the data more accessible 
via efficient Web portals. 
Third, NC DETECT and NC EDSS could be 
designed to look similar and be accessed by the user 
from a single website. Currently, the syndromic and 
reportable disease surveillance systems in North Caro-
lina have a different visual organization and design. 
The use of similar icons would facilitate moving from 
one system to the other; graphs and charts could be 
labeled similarly. The systems could be designed to 
exchange data electronically; for example, when a 
pertussis outbreak event is created in NC EDSS, data 
on the number of cases presenting to the ED with 
signs and symptoms characteristic of pertussis could 
be provided in a pop-up box. Design similarity and 
interoperability could support more effective surveil-
lance data integration. 
CoNCLuSIoNS
Research has demonstrated that syndromic surveillance 
data are valuable to national public health practice. 
Syndromic surveillance systems hold large amounts of 
data that can go unused, and this is also a potential 
issue with new types of data. Unless budgets for surveil-
lance are significantly increased, developing computer 
systems that facilitate the management of these grow-
ing data pools will be essential. The focus must be on 
making review and use of new data efficient, rather 
than on system sensitivity for rare events. Technology 
should be used to support public health surveillance 
practice, providing usable data while allowing increased 
sensitivity if desired. Future research should include 
the development of syndromes based on data on pub-
lic health actionability, and organizational protocols 
should be developed to support state and local access 
to important surveillance data.
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